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PROJECT  SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The research project summarized  here was jointly funded by the World Bank Research
Committee (RPO 676-71) and by USAID, Jakarta. This project followed an earlier similar
project on Nigeria ("A Study of the Impacts of Infrastructural  Deficiencies  on the Nigerian
Industrial Sector and Their Policy Implications"),  which was conducted  as part of the World
Bank  research program on urban infrastructure  and productivity.
The two projects applied the same methods and conceptual  frameworks in each of the
three countries. A sample of manufacturers  was surveyed in order to document  their qualitative
and  quantitative responses to  infrastructure deficiencies in  electricity, water,  transport,
telecommunications  and waste disposal. These responses were subjected to descriptive and
econometric analyses based on microeconomic  models of the firm. The results showed that
manufacturers  undertook significant expenditures to offset deficiencies in publicly provided
infrastructure  services but also, that public policy towards privately supplied infrastructure  and
the pricing of such infrastructure  can be adjusted from its current forms to yield significant
savings in social r'st.  While Thailand  and Indonesia  have  already made significant  strides in the
direction of our recommended  policies, Nigeria does lag behind and stands to benefit most from
such policy reform.
This summary is divided into seven sections. The contribution of  infrastructure to
productivity  is discusse-d  first making  clear the complementary  and changing  roles of the private-2-
and  public sectors  in  infrastructure provision.  Next,  we sketch the public  policy  framework
which  emphasizes  a  microeconomic  approach  to  studying  the  role  of  infrastructure  in  an
economy. The project's  rationale and its goals and methods are outlined, and empirical findings
are  discussed.  Lastly,  policy  recommendations  are  presented  with  respect  to  industrial
organization and with respect to the pricing of publicly supplied infrastructure.
INFRASTRUCTURE  AND PRODUCTIVITY
A  central  question  in  economic  development  is  the  extent  to  which  infrastructure
investment positively influences the economic growth and productivity of nations. Infrastructure
investment is a complex and multifaceted aspect of the national economies. Because it is difficult
to  study  such  a  multifaceted  problem  in  its  entirety,  studies  of  the  relationship  between
infrastructure and economic growth and productivity have been limited to specific aspects.
Such partial  views  have  led to  a  number of  widely held biases  about  infrastructure
investment. The most important of these biases is the treatment of infrastructure investment as
being exclusively in the public domain. This has led to the view that a study of public investment
is  essentially  a  study  of  infrastructure  investment.  This  view  ignores  several  important
characteristics of infrastructure.
First, there is an accelerating trend worldwide whereby publicly provided infrastructure
investments  and  infrastructure  facilities  are  becoming  privatized.  Privatization  affects  the
ownership as well as the management of these infrastructure systems. Privatization  implies that
future  increments of  infrastructure  investment will be  increasingly undertaken  by the private
sector or by public-private  partnerships.Second, there has been a continuing  trend in the industrialized  countries, to deregulate
and break up the large public or private monopolies. This has become feasible as well as
desirable  as technological  progress has gradually  eroded  the economies  of scale inherent  in some
natural monopolies.  A good example  of this is the telephone  industry in the United States.
Third, rapid economic  growth in many developing  nations  has forced the private sectors
in these economies  to undertake significant  investments  in infrastructure  services and facilities
in order to compensate  for deficiencies  in the publicly supplied infrastructure  services (World
Bank, 1994).
These developments  mean that infrastructure  cannot be viewed as an economic  activity
exclusively in the public domain. Results of studies of the effects of public investment  on
productivity  (e.g. Aschauer, 1989)  may not fully correlate with the effects of infrastructure  on
productivity  to the extent that studies do not include the significant  infrastructure  investments
in the private sector and the complex synergisms  and complementarities  between public and
private infrastructure  investments.
A second important bias in thinking about infrastructure,  stems from the belief that the
impacts of infrastructure investment on an economy are best understood  by  looking at the
macroeconomy.  This view, in turn, may be widely held because of the tendency to think of
infrastructure  investment  as public investment.  When  analyzing  the role of public investment  in
an economy, a macroeconomic  approach is the traditionally  dominant  perspective and this has
carried over to analyses  of infrastructure  as well.
The macroeconomy  bias masks several  crucial aspects  of the complex process by which
infrastructure  affects  an economy.  For example, urban  economies  play an increasingly  important-4  -
role in the growth of most developing  economies. Most industrialization  occurs in urban areas
and,  in the developing countries, the urban areas house increasing proportions of  national
populations  and gross national  product. Because  of these trends, infrastructure  investments  are
becoming increasingly  concentrated in urban areas and urban growth is becoming strongly
correlated with national  growth.
It  is increasingly recognized in recent years that urban concentrations of economic
activity contribute significantly to  economic growth (World Bank,  1991). Because urban
economic  activity  depends  heavily  on infrastructure  investments  such as roads, power  supply  and
water, the effects  of infrastructure  on the national  economy  can be understood  better by studying
first how the productivity  of an urban  economy  responds  to infrastructure  services  and then how
increased  productivity in urban areas shapes macroeconomic  growth.
More importantly, the economic  effects of infrastructure  investments  can be evaluated
and analyzed  better by taking an explicitly  microeconomic  approach. The key to such an effort
is the study of the processes  by which infrastructure  influences  households  and businesses, the
individual  agents which  drive the economy. A  proper microeconomic  approach  would  recognize
that economic  agents are not mere users of infrastructure  services supplied  by the public sector
but can also act as producers of some of these infrastructure  services.
Production  of infrastructure  services by households  and businesses  competes  with public
infrastructure  provision.  When  deficiencies  in the public infrastructure  supplies  or in the delivery
of services  are significant  so as to retard the productivity  of individual  agents, the private sector
will step in and, at least partially, fill that gap. This will happen  even when privately provided
infrastructure  is handicapped  by higher costs. The private sector will bear such higher costs if-5-
the privately provided infrastructure  is superior in quality to the public infrastructure.
Participation  of the private sector in infrastructure  provision can take one of two forms.
Individual  agents may respond by partially or completely  producing their own infrastructure
needs. Examples  are households  and firms installing  power generators  to circumvent  blackouts
in public electricity supplies and businesses  hiring messengers  to bypass unreliable telephone
service [Lee and Anas, 1992a]. The second response pattern is the emergence of privately
controlled infrastructure industries which produce and  deliver services to  households and
businesses.  Examples  of this are water vendors  who may supply  the daily water needs  of villages
not served well by public water delivery [Whittington  et.al.  1989] and package and message
delivery firms that compensate  for the lack of adequate  public mail and telephone  services and
privately owned and operated utility companies.
A PUBLIC  POLICY FRAMEWORK
The perspective that infrastructure  should be studied using microeconomics  and the
observation that infrastructure issues straddle the public and the private sectors, means that
public policy towards infrastructure  needs to be rethought.
There are several policy implications  which stem from this new perspective.
First,  proper accounting of  the  infrastructure stock of a  nation must consider the
infrastructure  facilities and services provided in the private sector as well as the infrastructure
provided by the public sector, either in-house by households  and businesses or through the
infrastructure  service markets.
Second,  public policy on infrastructure  must be formulated  by taking into account how-6-
the  private  sector  will  respond  to  each policy  by  modifying  its  stock  and  configuration  of
infrastructure capacities so that the benefits from all infrastructure (public as well as private) are
maximized. More specifically,  it is a challenge to policy makers that policies on  infrastructure
do not result in wasteful duplication of infrastructure facilities or in ruinous competition between
public and  private  infrastructure providers.  Rather,  policy makers should  seek to  formulate
policies on infrastructure which seek to enhance the complementarities and synergisms between
the publicly and privately provided infrastructure services.
Third,  a  microeconomic  perspective  should  be  adopted  in  seeking  and  formulating
innovative policies toward infrastructure. In such an effort insights from the theory of industrial
organization are the most relevant and aggregative studies of the impacts of infrastructure on the
macroeconomy  are  the  least  relevant.  Policy  makers  must  learn  to  work  with  the  private
infrastructure markets, developing policies which induce and encourage the private infrastructure
markets to step in and fill the infrastructure gaps in those areas where the public infrastructure
services are inadequate and difficult to improve.
Fourth,  in  many  developing  countries,  there  is  a  complex  web  of  regulations  and
institutional  barriers  which  inhibit  the  private  provision  of  infrastructure  services.  Such
constraints and barriers need to be relaxed for the private sector to achieve its potential in filling
infrastructure gaps. Although in some parts of the developing world, governments are beginning
to welcome such private participation,  it is still true in the rest of the world that infrastructure
services are provided  by  protected public  monopolies even  in  the face of  highly  inefficient
behavior by such monopolies.
Fifth  and  finally,  infrastructure  policy  entails  important  efficiency-related  and-7-
distributional  questions. The distributional  aspects of infrastructure  policy tend to get masked
in the macroeconomic  approach to viewing infrastructure. However, once a  microeconomic
approach is adopted, it becomes  clear that not all agents in an economy have equal access to
infrastructure  services  and facilities  and that not all micro agents can compensate  with equal ease
and cost for the deficiencies  in public infrastructure  systems. In particular, because many types
of infrastructure require significant scale economies, smaller users of infrastructure such as
households  and small businesses  bear a disproportionate  burden of private provision. For this
reason, it is especially important that public policy seek to foster the emergence of viable
infrastructure  service providers in the markets.
PROJECT  RATIONALE.  GOALS.  AND METHODS
The purpose of this research project and the earlier project on Nigeria was to make
specific  contributions  to the study of infrastructure  in a way which is consistent  with the above
perspective.
A chief substantive  goal in the project was to study infrastructure  provision in the private
sector and how such provision related to the quality of the infrastructure  services provided  by
the public sector.
A second and equally important  methodological  goal was to analyze the infrastructure-
related  questions  at the microeconomic  level and, in this way, lay the foundation for a "bottom-
to-top" approach to the infrastructure  question. The microeconomic  perspective meant that the
units of  analysis had to  be  individual economic agents not industries or  other economic
aggregates.-8-
Practical  considerations  restricted  the scope of the study in a number of ways.
First, we focused  on the infrastructure  related  problems  and investments  of manufacturers
only. Thus, the way in which infrastructure  deficiencies  directly impacted households,  public
agencies  and non-manufacturing  businesses  was not studied.
Second, relatively little data on infrastructure  needs and conditions were available for
individual  manufacturers  in an economy. For this reason, virtually  all of the needed  micro level
data had to be collected within the project by means of questionnaires  directed to a sample of
manufacturers  in each country. The questionnaires  used in each country are contained  in the
Annex to the project reports.
Third, because project resources were limited, we could not devote equal attention to
each of the important infrastructure  sectors on which we collected data. Although data was
collected  on manufacturers'  infrastructure  needs  and conditions  with respect  to power provision,
water supply, labor and freight transport, telecommunications  and waste disposal, the quantity
and quality of  information obtained varied considerably among these sectors. Hence, the
project's chief contribution has been on an extensive and detailed analysis of infrastructure
deficiencies  and manufacturers'  responses in power generation, a more limited analysis of the
water supply  deficiencies  and responses  and merely  descriptive  presentations  of the problems  and
private responses in transport, telecommunications  and waste disposal. Despite this selective
focus, we believe that our findings and conclusions  do generalize  to virtually all infrastructure
sectors and we have gathered much evidence through field observations  to support the belief.
In studying manufacturers'  responses  to deficiencies  in the power sector we had several
specific  project objectives.- 9  - - L
First, we sought to study the three countries (Nigeria, Indonesia  and Thailand)  using a
unified framework of  analyses, models and concepts. This provides a  useful test of  our
microeconomic  approach in different national  environments  and, hence, a demonstration  of the
transferability of  the approach.  The use of  the three countries, also allows us  to  make
comparisons  of how manufacturers'  needs  and responses  vary as the level of public infrastructure
deficiencies  vary from very bad in Nigeria, to serious in Indonesia,  to much better in Thailand.
Second,  we aimed to develop  a microeconomic  theory of the firm (i.e. the representative
manufacturer  in our samples) which allows the firm to blend electricity it purchases from the
public sector with electricity which it produces internally. Such a model in which electricity
production is a technology  embedded  within the firm's primary production technology  allows
us to examine, in detail, the substitution  and complementarity  relationships  between electricity
and other inputs in primary production and,  more importantly, between public sector and
internally  generated  electricity.
Third, we aimed that our microeconomic  model  be amenable  to econometric  estimation
so that various measures  of the firms' production technology  can be quantified  and analyzed in
order to shed light on the central policy questions in each country and in order to facilitate
comparisons  across the three different countries.
Our theoretical model and its associated  econometric procedure can be applied to the
other infrastructure  sectors and we have in fact tested it to a limited extent for the water sector
in Nigeria  where internal  provision  of water  by firms  (which sink boreholes  on their factory lots)
competes with water supply from the public sector. With better data in the future, when the
microeconomic  approach to infrastructure  becomes  more widely accepted, we believe that our- 10  -
model can be applied to a joint analysis of all the infrastructure responses of  firms. With
appropriate  modification,  the model  can also be applied to the behavior  of households  and non-
manufacturing  businesses.
As a fourth objective, we used our estimated microeconomic  model to shed light on a
number of policy issues regarding the pricing of publicly supplied electricity. Although we
recognize  that pricing is a small part of the big policy  picture, it is nevertheless  an important
piece of it. While pricing  policy should  not be contemplated  as separate from the broader issues
of industrial  organization, there is no possible industrial reorganization  of infrastructure  which
does not carry with it strong implications  for an appropriate pricing policy.
As a fifth and final objective,  we have  placed  our findings  regarding  the pricing  of public
infrastructure  services, into the broader context of industrial  organization  policy [Baumol  and
Lee,  1991]. In particular, the theory of contestable markets is the appropriate theoretical
backdrop  against which the organization  of private and public infrastructure  markets, including
questions  of pricing, should be considered.
The support for our recommendations  for policy actions in the industrial organization
front are supported  by extensive  evidence  we have  gathered  in field observations,  by case  studies
of deregulation  of utilities in developing  countries  and by some  of the qualitative  and quantitative
responses  of the firms in our samples of manufacturers  in the three countries.
EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS
Our empirical findings  are grouped into three parts:  those which are supported  by the
descriptive  analysis  of the data in the three surveys  as well as our field observations  [Report  No.- 11  -
1], those which are revealed by the econometric  testing of our microeconomic  model [Report
No.2] and those which flow from policy simulations  on pricing based on the results of the
econometric  analysis [Report No.3].
The descriptive results are  detailed in  Report Number 1 [Project Background and
Descriptive  Analysis]  as well  as in prior discussion  papers [Lee and Anas, 1989  and 1992b].  The
findings  from the descriptive  analysis  enriched  our qualitative  and quantitative  understanding  of
the impact  of infrastructure  deficiencies  on manufacturing  establishments.
Not surprisingly, we were able to  document that firms can adjust to  infrastructure
deficiencies in a number of ways. An obvious form of adjustment is that a business remains
captive to  the  inadequate public service incurring the  higher costs  associated with  the
unreliability  of such service. This results in lower productivity, less output and lower quality
output. The infrastructure  deficiency  can affect the firm's production process in a multitude  of
ways which depend on the technology  used by the firm.
Some firms are so sensitive  to fluctuations  in power or other infrastructure  that, when
they are in the "captive"  regime, any interruption  in supply forces them to shut down or suffer
prohibitive losses to output or to inputs (e.g. machinery). Other firms are not impacted as
severely but they suffer by losing output or producing  lower quality output. A second type of
response occurs when the firm is resourceful  enough that it tries to achieve self-sufficiency  by
producing  its entire infrastructure  need within the plant. This, of course, is typical  of the larger
firms but is observed for some smaller firms as well. A self-sufficient  firm usually incurs a
much higher unit cost because it cannot match the scale economies  which are available  to the
public sector.- 12 -
A third and more interesting  response  entails  a compromise  between captivity  and self-
sufficiency.  In the case of electric power, for example, the firm blends the two types of power
: the public power source which is cheap but of lower quality (e.g. subject to more voltage
fluctuations)  and the firm's own power  source which is more expensive  but of a higher quality.
We found that firms  blend for a variety of reasons which  relate to their technology  of production
and to their attitudes towards risk and uncertainty.
One reason for blending, as we have already hinted above, is that captivity and self-
sufficiency  are each prohibitively  expensive.  By blending,  the firm  allows itself  use of the public
supply in those periods during its production runs when such supply is relatively reliable and
switches  to its own power when it detects that the public  supply begins to or is likely to fail or
deteriorate  in quality. Such a firm might install  sophisticated  equipment  for detecting  upcoming
voltage fluctuations.  This behavior is typical  of firms that must have a reliable or uninterrupted
power supply at all times.
A second reason for blending is that the higher quality internal power supply is used at
all times in order to 'boost" the lower  quality  public supply, thus assuring the firm a continuous
supply  of reliable power.
Blending  and self-sufficiency  are achieved  by installing  private  generating  capacity  within
the plant. We observed that in Nigeria (more than in the other countries)  virtually all firms had
installed a generating capacity which was sufficient to power the entire plant if necessary.
Hence, such firms  were observed  to be carrying  idle generating  capacity  at almost  all times. This
is an indication  that private generating  capacity is seen, in part, as insurance  against prolonged
shutdowns  in the public sector. It was not surprising that such idle generating capacity should- 13 -
be highest in Nigeria where interruptions  in the public supply are severe and frequent, less
common  in Indonesia  where interruptions  are less frequent  and external  alternatives  to the public
source are available, and even less common in Thailand where the public supply of power is
more reliable.
The effects  of deficiencies  on business  formation  and on employment  growth are difficult
to observe  directly but easy to surmise. On the margin, infrastructure  deficiencies  and the high
fixed costs of offsetting such deficiencies  should retard business formation and employment
growth. The extent of this effect is a worthwhile topic for further study but requires more
sophisticated  data collection.
An increase  in infrastructural  deficiencies  can also cause some existing firms to go out
of business  or to cancel or delay plans for expansion. It is obvious that the retarding effects on
potential new firms and marginal existing firms increase in severity as firm size gets smaller
because  smaller firms do not have the scale economies  for dealing with the high setup costs of
internal infrastructure  provision.
Households,  as well as firms, must choose how to adapt to infrastructure  inadequacies.
Like firms, households  can choose  among  remaining  captive  to inadequate  public  service, opting
for self-sufficiency, and blending public and own provision. For  example, in the case of
electricity, most households  opt for captive  status, and few for self-sufficiency,  while in Nigeria,
some wealthy households  opt for blending, buying power generators for use when the public
service fails.
Using the quantitative  responses  of the surveyed  manufacturers  in Nigeria, Indonesia  and
Thailand we were able to document  clearly how the burden of private infrastructure  provision- 14 -
decreases  with the size of firm. This was found to be true in each country and for each type of
infrastructure: power, water, transport, telecommunications  and waste disposal. As extensively
documented in  Report Number 1, smaller manufacturers on  the average devote a  higher
percentage  of their resources to each one of these infrastructural  needs and pay higher implicit
marginal  prices in self provision  than do larger firms. In the case of power  provision in Nigeria,
small manufacturers  bear marginal costs as  much as seven or  eight times higher than the
marginal costs born by the public sector. These high multiples  are evidence that firms attach
great value to a high quality power supply.
An econometric confirmation of the basic result that the marginal cost of embedded
electricity  substantially  declines  with firm size, was done using our econometric  models of the
blending  firms in Nigeria and Indonesia.  (There were very few blenders in Thailand where the
ptiblic power supply is fairly reliable); The econometric  results  are included  in Report  Number
2 [Econometric  Analysis].
In addition  to confirming  the presence  of strong  scale economies  in private provision,  our
econometric  results for Nigeria and Indonesia  revealed that the shadow prices of firms for the
publicly supplied electricity were much higher than the marginal costs of purchasing such
electricity and also much higher than the marginal cost of producing  electricity internally. As
well, the marginal  cost of producing  electricity  internally,  as noted  earlier, was generally  higher
than the marginal  tariff price paid to the public sector for purchased  electricity.
Since shadow price measures  the willingness  to pay for marginal quantities  of a limited
resource, the finding that the shadow  price for public electricity  exceeds the marginal cost of
internally  produced  electricity  means that firms would much  prefer to buy their electricity  rather- 15 -
than to produce it themselves.
If own electricity  and purchased  electricity  were perfect substitutes  in production, firms
should  value additional  purchased  electricity  at the marginal  cost of the produced  electricity  they
decided  to produce. The fact that this was not found strongly  suggests that internally  produced
and purchased  electricity  are complements  not substitutes.
A robust  econometric  finding  was that the shadow  price of bought  electricity  fell with the
level of electricity  bought.  Larger firms  (which  buy more  electricity)  value bought  electricity  less
at the margin than do smaller firms. The elasticity  of the shadow price with respect to bought
electricity (a proxy for the size of the firm) in each country was highly similar to the elasticity
of the marginal cost of internal electricity with respect to the quantity of internal electricity.
These similarities  suggest  that the firms' willingness  to pay for public electricity  varies directly
with the firms' marginal cost of providing  their own electricity.
As we shall see below, these empirical  findings  serve  as the underpinnings  of our policy
recommendations  for a more  efficient  and equitable  infrastructure  policy  in developing  countries.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:  MARKETS  FOR INFRASTRUCTURE  SERVICES
The starting point for the need  to reform infrastructure  policy in developing  countries  is
that  publicly  supplied infrastructure  services  are limited  in both quality and quantity.  The reasons
{or such limitations  vary among countries.
In  Nigeria, where  economic growth has  not  been  rapid  in  recent  decades, the
infrastructure  limitations  arise from inefficiencies  in management,  in the supply and delivery  of
spare parts and in maintenance.  In the Nigerian power sector there is an adequate generating- 16 -
capacity all of which is controlled by NEPA (the Nigerian Electric Power Authority) but the
above causes of  inefficiency result in bottlenecks in  the  transmission and  distribution of
electricity.  For a variety of reasons (stemming  from X-inefficiencies  of all kinds), the sources
of the inefficiencies  cannot be eliminated  in the short run and it is realistic to assume that the
problems  will persist for the long run.
In Indonesia,  and more so in Thailand, the same difficulties  do not appear to exist but
the rapid growth of these two economies  makes it difficult for the public sector to expand its
generation, transmission  and distribution of power at an adequate pace. This, in turn, has
resulted in bottlenecks which reduce the supply of  reliable power and other infrastructure
services  supplied by the public sector.
What is an appropriate industrial  organization  policy in light of such a limitation  on the
part of the public sector to eliminate  or substantially  reduce infrastructure  deficiencies  ?
Our most fundamental  argument is that a policy of protecting the public infrastructure
monopolies  is not optirmal.  Such a protectionist  approach prevents the users of infrastructure
services from seeking other sources  of infrastructure  services  and induces them to succumb  to
the regime of captivity  which, as we discussed, retards productivity.
A protectionist  policy towards NEPA is observed in Nigeria. The government  supports
NEPA as the single supplier of power in the whole country, does not allow private utility
companies  to  enter the power market and taxes imported  electricity  generators that are installed
by manufacturers.  Although  manufacturers  are allowed  to install  their own generating  equipment
they must obtain  a government  license  to do so and this can be an expensive  and time consuming
process. Manufacturers  are not allowed to sell power to each other. In Indonesia,  on the other- 17 -
hand, the PLN is a public  monopoly  which  receives  less  government  protection. The government
has reduced import  taxes on generators  and is beginning  to allow the formation  of private power
generating  utilities.
Clearly, the Indonesian policy towards private sector participation is more efficient
socially than is the Nigerian  policy of extreme protectionism.  A further inefficiency  occurred
in Nigeria where the government  policy prior to  1989 sought to offset the poor quality of
publicly available power by greatly subsidizing  NEPA so that public power was priced much
below its marginal cost of production. This situation was partially remedied by the sizable
increase in the electricity tariff in  1989. However, as we shall see in the next section, the
structure of the  Nigerian tariff needs considerable overhauling before it can become fully
efficient. In Indonesia,  power  pricing is more sensible  and PLN recovers  all of its operating  cost
plus a portion of the cost of new investment.
The big gains in economic efficiency in  developing countries would come from a
reorganization  of the infrastructure  sectors.  The relevant  theory  for guiding  such a reorganization
policy is the theory of contestable  markets. In the case of Nigeria  we were able to illustrate  how
this would work in the power sector. The theory of contestable  markets is based on the notion
that complex and interrelated economic  activities can be unbundled into separate but related
functions. Those functions  which are subject to high scale economies  and are associated  with
high sunk costs  are candidates  for remaining  in the public  sector or operated  by large monopolies
regulated  by the government.  In the market  for power, the transmission  and distribution  network
is such an activity. It would be natural for NEPA to remain the single operator of the national
transmission  and distribution  grid.- 18 -
Power generation, on the other hand, is characterized  by relatively low entry costs and
is a contestable  industry. Were Nigerian policy to allow it, a number of market arrangements
would emerge. Many large firms would find it feasible  to utilize their idle excess generating
capacity by producing electricity and selling it to adjacent smaller firms or to NEPA's grid.
Private power companies  would emerge and would make use of NEPA's grid by transmitting
their power to various  customers. Utility  pools would potentially  emerge as consortia  of closely
located  firms that would  build their own common  power  plant which  would sell its excess  power
to NEPAs grid.
The options available  to the small manufacturers  would  increase, as such firms would  be
able to  buy power from NEPA, from larger firms in their vicinity, from private power
companies  or from utility pools. NEPA's revenues  would be enhanced  by selling use of its grid
to the various private suppliers. In the long run, if NEPA could improve grid operations and
reduce transmission  bottlenecks,  an increasing  portion of the privately produced power would
be transacted  on the transmission  grid. In the short run, the private producers would prefer,
where possible, to sell their power off the grid in order to avoid the transmission  problems.
To  move in this direction of  making the market for power as fully contestable as
possible, Nigerian authorities would have to liberalize  the production, buying and selling of
power among the various users of power. Indonesia  and Thailand  are moving in this
direction while Nigeria shows no signs of reforming its practice.
The contestability  of various infrastructure  services means that many users of public
infrastructure  services would find attractive  substitutes  in the private sector. This in turn means
that the demand for the public services  which  are limited  in quantity  and quality would  decrease.- 19  -
Hence,  with reduced  demands,  bottlenecks  in the delivery  of public infrastructure  services  would
become  reduced a! well. This, in turn, would improve  the quality  of services available  through
the public sector.
Liberalized  and contestable  infrastructure  provision is one way of dealing with the more
efficient allocation of the scarce infrastructure  capacity of a developing  nation. These policies
would make infrastructure  services  more readily available  to the smaller users who find it most
difficult to absorb the high cost of infrastructure  deficiencies.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:  PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE  PRICING
How the public sector prices its infrastructure  services is an integral component  of a
better infrastructure  policy. First, the public sector  or some regulated  monopolistic  supplier  will
continue to remain the chief supplier of infrastructure  services such as power and water. It is
reasonable  to assume that the majority  of users will continue  to purchase services from such a
large supplier. Second, it is also reasonable  to assume that the causes of the infrastructure
deficiencies  will continue to persist and bottlenecks  in transmission  of power or in the delivery
of water will remain as long run conditions.
Under such circumstances,  how can pricing scarce infrastructure  resources result in a
better allocation of  these resources ?  We can begin to answer this by  looking at current
infrastructure  pricing policy in developing  countries. We see that in the three countries we
studied, the public providers charge a tariff with quantity discounts (decreasing block tariff)
much  as one would  find in the developed  and industrialized  countries. The usual  rationale  behind
decreasing  block tariffs is that they encourage  the purchase of larger quantities  thus enhancing- 20 -
the economies  of scale inherent in production  and in delivery.
The situation is quite different  when infrastructure  deficiencies  are present as is the case
in developing  countries. When such is the case, the production  of larger quantities  puts a strain
on the delivery of the service by increasing  system load and system congestion. This, in turn,
results in bottlenecks and in failures which reduces the quality of the infrastructure service
delivered.
Recall now  our finding,  explained  earlier, that the smaller  users of infrastructure  services
value such services  more (have higher shadow  prices) than do the larger users. Yet the smaller
users also have a lower  capacity to bear the costs of private provision because their operations
do not have the benefit  of high scale economies.  Hence, decreasing  block tariffs in a developing
countries  context favor the larger users who  value the infrastructure  service the least and burden
the smaller users who value the service the most.
To rectify this situation  by making the limited infrastructure  services available  to those
who  value it the most, we recommend  that  public sector power in Nigeria and Indonesia  be sold
according to an increasing  block tariff. Under such a tariff, the marginal price charged to a
larger purchaser of electricity will be much higher than the marginal price charged to a small
purchaser.
In the case of manufacturers,  the larger firms which have sufficient generating  capacity
installed  will prefer to produce more of their own power from their own generators, reducing
their reliance on the public source. The smaller users, will be facing much lower prices from
the public sector and may decide to stop using their generators and rely more heavily on the
public source. The result, so far, is that power will have been allocated from those who value- 21 -
it the least  and face the  lowest cost in producing  it privately to those who value it the most and
face the highest marginal cost in producing it privately. Such a redistribution increases  social
efficiency.
A further benefit exists if the reallocation  of power induced  by an increasing  block tariff
is such that the aggregate  purchases of power from the public sector are reduced. When that
happens, then the level of congestion on the public transmission  network is lowered and the
quality  of the power delivered  increases.  The increasing  block tariff results not only in a socially
more efficient redistribution  of the infrastructure  service  but in a higher quality service as well.
In Report Number  3 we describe the results of various simulations  in which NEPA and
PLN are assumed to switch their tariffs from a decreasing  block structure currently present, to
an increasing  block structure  that maximizes  the welfare gain from the switch. In Nigeria, which
currently offers steep quantity discounts, savings in total manufacturing  operating costs were
about 4  % assuming there were no changes in public power reliability. Allowing for the
possibility  that reliability improved  as the demand for public  power fell, the total cost savings
increased to 7.3 % or 9 % depending  on the elasticity of reliability with respect to aggregate
purchase from the public sector.
The results for Indonesia  are much less dramatic, because the decreasing  block nature
of PLNs tariff is very slight and because under the more liberal Indonesian  policies  a big part
of the potential benefits have already been realized. Cost reductions from an optimal tariff
without  a change in reliability  was only 0.1 %. Even  under the assumption  that unreliability  fell
as purchases  decreased, percentage  cost savings were still minimal.
In both Nigeria and Indonesia,  the benefits in the form of savings in operating  costs were- 22 -
the highest for the smaller manufacturers.  The optimal tariff was one with a steep increasing
block structure. Such a tariff is well approximated  with a rationing  policy that disconnects  from
NEPA  or PLN those large  manufacturers  who  have adequate  private  generating  capacity installed
and sells power to the smaller users for a very low marginal  price. The marginal price remains
low with the quantity  purchased  up to a point  and then rises  steeply  with quantity  purchased. The
policy makes better use of the generating  capacity installed in the private sector.
While Nigeria stands to reap big gains from implementing  an increasing  block tariff
policy, the same policy  will have  only slight  benefits in Indonesia,  where public policy  has been
moving  gradually away from a protectionist  stance  and where the existing tariff structure does
not incorporate  significant  quantity  discounts.
CONCLUSIONS
The chief contributions  of this study has been to demonstrate  the strong  complementarity
between  the public and private infrastructure  sectors in developing  nations. Cases in point are
the manufacturing  sectors of Nigeria, Indonesia  and Thailand where significant  adjustments  in
the private sectors have mitigated  infrastructural  deficiencies  with various degrees of success.
Government policy towards the industrial organization and pricing of  infrastructure
sectors plays an important role in helping an economy realize the benefits of private sector
participation and  in  mitigating the adverse effects of  infrastructure deficiencies on  small
manufacturers. Our  policy recommendations  apply with  full  force in  Nigeria where the
government  continues to be protective of public infrastructure  monopolies  and not friendly to
private sector participation. Our recommendations  are supported by the relative successes  of- 23 -
Indonesia  and Thailand where the impacts  of the deficiencies  have been rendered less severe,
in part, because the public sector has encouraged  private sector involvement  in infrastructure
provision.
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